Policy-makers often rely on public opinion polls to decide which political projects to pursue. We study how the use of opinion polls influences policy outcomes if respondents feel pressured to offer "socially desirable" views when answering the pollsters' questions. Our results indicate that this type of social pressure can lead to second-best policy outcomes even if politicians are aware of the bias. The context for the empirical part of our study is the siting of a radioactive waste repository in Pennsylvania. We model the local politicians' decision to support this facility as guided by economic concerns and by social pressure. We find that social pressure is critical for an explanation of local policy-making.
Introduction
In democratic societies, policy-makers often rely on public opinion to make political decisions. Politicians gauge the public's views in personal conversations, in public meetings, and, perhaps most importantly, through opinion polls (Page and Shapiro, 1983 ). In the United States, polling became an important presidential instrument during the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1995) . The White House now typically employs a staff of more than fifty to monitor the ups and downs of citizen sentiments, and presidents spend millions of dollars annually to observe public opinion (Heith, 1998) . Information on public opinion is valuable because it allows policy-makers to more effectively represent their constituency, thereby increasing the probability of being re-elected.
Polls, focus groups, townhall meetings and personal conversations with citizens may also reveal strategic opportunities. For example, President Clinton introduced his plan for health care reform at a time when the number of citizens who believed that health insurance should be left solely to the private sector was at an all-time low (American National Election Studies, 1992).
In this paper, we analyze how public opinion influences the policy positions that elected officials choose to take. If citizens reveal their true preferences in public discussions and in the polls, this relationship is straightforward. By observing the citizens' views, politicians learn about the preferences of their constituency and their policy platforms resemble those preferences more closely. However, there is much evidence that individuals sometimes choose to misrepresent their publicly declared preferences (Kuran, 1995; Noelle-Neumann, 1984 ). In particular, they often exaggerate their support for socially desirable activities such as recycling, religious attendance, and voting (Presser and Stinson, 1998 ; Katosh and Traugott, 1981) . 1 For example, Connelly and Brown (1994) , using data from personal interviews, compare reported contributions to New York's "Return a Gift to Wildlife" program with actual donations. They find that 13% of upstate and 21% of downstate residents claim to contribute, while records of actual donations show a 5% contribution rate in both areas. On the other hand, individuals often underreport the extent to which they support and engage in undesirable activities such as alcohol consumption, smoking and compulsive buying (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960; Levy, 1981 ; Ganster, Hennessey, and Luthans, 1983; Zerbe and Paulhus, 1987; Mensch and Kandel, 1988) . The resulting bias is known as social desirability bias. 2 The bias is most likely to arise if respondents answer socially sensitive questions (Fisher, 1993) . For example, most individuals who have negative attitudes toward blacks and the handicapped are reluctant to reveal them (Jones and Sigall, 1971 ).
In many instances, social desirability appears to reflect a desire to conform to the majority opinion on a particular issue. In an experimental study, Marsh (1984) asked parents with children under twenty about their opinion on abortion: "In general, do you 1 There are several ways to measure such discrepancies. The simplest method is to compare the responses of a representative group with measures of aggregate behavior. For example, the number of cigarettes that individuals reportedly smoke does not add up to aggregate cigarette consumption (Bohley, 1985) . However, this method raises questions of sample composition. As an alternative, psychologists have used "bogus pipeline" experiments to establish differences between reported and actual behavior. In these experiments, a group of respondents is led to believe that the person conducting the experiment can detect lies with the help of some sophisticated machinery. The responses of this group tend to be significantly different from responses given by a control group. For example, many more individuals report to frequently have oral sex when they believe that they face a lie detector (Tourangeau, Smith, and Rasinski, 1997) . Similarly, subjects seem more likely to accurately report sensitive behavior if they are aware that researchers have access to information on their actual behavior (Marquis, Marquis, and Polich, 1986) . 2 As the examples indicate, the term "social desirability" as used in this literature is not equivalent to welfare in an economic sense. Drinking is often seen as "socially undesirable" even though it may enhance the individual welfare of the drinker. Rather than representing a measure of welfare, in this literature "social desirability" reflects notions of proper and morally correct behavior. We will use the term in the latter sense. think the law should be left as it is, or should abortion be made easier to get, or should it be made more difficult to get?" Before answering this question, one group of respondents was told that the general trend in public opinion was more permissive, another group that the trend was more restrictive. Marsh finds that respondents are significantly more likely to advocate increased availability of abortion if they were told that the trend in public opinion was more permissive, and vice versa.
In this paper, we develop a simple model of policy choice when information is distorted due to a social desirability bias. In the first part of the study, we analyze a game where a policy-maker needs to decide whether or not to support a project. The project may or may not benefit the politician's constituency. The politician maximizes his chance of being re-elected by supporting projects which benefit the median voter. While the politician does not know if the project is good for his constituency, he observes the results of an opinion poll prior to making his decision. We show that distorted opinion polls do not influence policy if the nature of uncertainty is simple. For instance, if the elected official is only uncertain about the mean of an ex ante known distribution of benefits, biased polling information will not impact policy. However, when uncertainty is more complex, social pressure can distort policy. In these cases, the pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game we study is second best, and there is no guarantee that the politician supports all the projects that benefit his constituency.
In the empirical section of the paper, we try to capture the influence of social pressure on public opinion and policy outcomes. To study how these choices vary with social pressure, we conducted a survey asking local elected officials in Pennsylvania if they favored the siting of a nuclear waste repository in their township. The State of Pennsylvania is currently searching for a new location to deposit its low-and mid-level radioactive wastes.
The survey shows that most supervisors do not wish to have this repository sited in their township. Our analysis indicates that these negative responses are strongly influenced by public opinion. Township supervisors oppose the repository because they believe that most residents disapprove of the facility. The empirical results also indicate that social pressure is one of the forces that critically affects public opinion and therewith policy outcomes.
This finding is consistent with our theoretical results.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss the importance of social desirability and social pressure for policy-making. We present a simple signaling model in section 3. In section 4, we investigate the importance of social pressure in the context of the Pennsylvania siting problem. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
Social Desirability Effects
Why do people exaggerate their support for activities and political programs that they perceive to be popular? This question has been examined for a long time in the fields of psychology and personnel testing (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960) . "Socially desirable" behavior in the sense discussed here appears to be driven by a desire for impression management and the pleasures of self-deception (Paulhus, 1984) . When answering socially sensitive questions, respondents attempt to present themselves favorably to others (the impression management component) and to themselves (the self-deception component).
Social scientists are acutely aware of the fact that social desirability effects may bias the results of their studies. Researchers have developed a number of techniques by which they hope to control for desirability effects. 3 The simplest way is to assure individuals of as much anonymity as possible. For example, social desirability effects are generally stronger in face-to-face conversations and telephone surveys than in self-administered paper-andpencil questionnaires (Tourangeau, Smith, and Rasinski, 1997) . Another possibility to control for social desirability bias is to use scales that measure a person's inclination to bias his answers (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960; Paulhus, 1992 ). This method is often employed in psychological research (see, e.g., Mick, 1996; Moorman and Podsakoff, 1992) . Marketing researchers have used indirect questioning techniques to reduce bias (Bearden and Etzel, 1982) . With indirect questioning, respondents are asked if they expect someone else to purchase a particular product. Researchers have found that individuals are less likely to engage in impression management when they report on "a consumer's" decisions because there is no incentive to protect the reputation of an unknown person (Fisher, 1993) .
For the purposes of our analysis, it is key that individuals are more likely to respond in a "socially desirable" manner if they declare their preferences in a non-anonymous setting. For reasons of cost and speed, most political and many social science surveys are conducted by telephone (e.g., Gallup, National Election Studies). Others employ face-toface interviews (e.g., General Social Survey). Using these techniques, it is simple to identify respondents and, depending on the nature of the questions, social desirability effects may exist. In contrast, voting takes place in anonymous settings where social desirability effects are likely to be small (or absent). 4 In the voting booth, citizens are guaranteed privacy.
Thus, social desirability plays a less important role. From the policy-maker's perspective, this limits the usefulness of public opinion surveys. As citizens vote their true preferences, the lawmaker's re-election depends on how well his policy choices reflect these preferences.
However, in opinion polls and personal conversations, citizens' true preferences may be hidden behind a mask of socially accepted behavior.
Pollsters are well aware that social desirability effects may impair the quality of their re-election forecasts. The 1992 British general election is a good example. The five major pollsters predicted a 1.3% Labour lead. The final result was a landslide victory (7.6% lead) for the Conservatives. Subsequent research has shown that social desirability effects were partly responsible for the poor quality of the forecasts. Conservatives, feeling that John Major and their party in general had become unfashionable, were less likely to reveal their true voting intention in telephone surveys. Some conservative voters pretended not to know whom they wanted to vote for, others refused to be interviewed. Refusal to participate occurred with greater probability among Conservatives than among Labour supporters (Party, 1994; Worcester, 1996 ; for a discussion of this phenomenon in German elections, see Noelle-Neumann, 1984). Similar observations were made prior to the 1995 Quebec referendum. The polls indicated a 4 to 7-point lead for those favoring independence (typically about 48% yes, 40% no and 12% undecided). The final count turned out to be 50.6% against independence. In contrast to the British general election, Canadian polling organizations correctly predicted the very close outcome. They speculated that the polls might be biased because French-speakers perceived it to be politically incorrect to oppose independence. Thus, the pollsters counted all "undecided" as "no" which resulted in rather precise predictions of the final outcome (Binder, 1995) .
The Quebec referendum and the abortion example that we discussed in the introduction suggest that social desirability may not be the only reason why individuals at times prefer not to reveal their true political preferences. As one moves from purely personal choices to the realm of politics, outright social pressure (in addition to social desirability) may also play a role. We think of social pressure as the ability of individuals and organized groups to reward the members of their own group and to inflict economic costs on those who do not share their views. Anti-abortion groups may protest in front of homes of wellknown supporters of abortion. Business owners who publicly oppose the independence of Quebec may experience that those who favor independence prefer to take their business elsewhere. While social desirability is more closely linked to subtle notions of social approval and psychic benefits and costs, we think of social pressure as forms of influence that entail economic payoffs. For the purposes of this paper, we will not differentiate between social desirability and social pressure because both have the potential to influence public statements in similar ways. Instead, we will use social pressure as an umbrella term that aggregates both types of influence.
Model of Policy Choice
Our review of the literature suggests that survey participants systematically bias their responses if they feel pressured to do so. In this section, we develop a simple model that builds on this insight. The game involves N voters, labeled i ∈ N = {1, ..., N} in a political district and an elected official. Representative r needs to decide how much effort he wants to expend on advancing or hindering a proposed project. The voters know if the project benefits them personally. In contrast, r only has knowledge of the voters' publicly declared preferences that he learns from an opinion poll. As the project in question involves socially sensitive issues, there is no guarantee that the voters answer the pollster's questions truthfully.
The pay-off for voter i is given by
p is the probability that the project will be implemented. This probability depends he receives recognition from other supporters and may be shunned by the opposition. The pay-off for supporters includes both psychic and economic benefits and costs. Analogously, if i opposes (S i = 0), the opposition rewards and supporters may punish him. We assume that the opposition is stronger than the supporting camp. That is, citizens incur a cost C > 0 if they publicly support the project.
The representative's probability of being re-elected γ depends on the benefit of the project for the median voter, B m . The larger the benefit, the more likely it is that r can keep his job. Note that the electoral success depends on B m and not on the median voter's response in the poll. This captures the idea that survey responses are more likely to be influenced by social pressure than voting decisions. Voters also pay attention to r's efforts.
The idea is that r cannot determine policy single-handedly, and that he gets some credit for trying to stop a policy that hurts the median voter. We model these two motivations by assuming that γ is a function of (e × B m ). Finally, r takes into account that effort comes at the cost of T . r's pay-off is then given by
where R > 0 denotes the representative's rent for holding office -the "spoils of office"
or "ego-rents" in Rogoff's (1990) terminology.
We model the polling process as a dynamic signaling game of complete but imperfect 2 to be an equilibrium, the marginal citizen who opposes the project must be indifferent between publicly supporting and rejecting the undertaking. 5 Thus, for this individual, r knows that qB i = 0, where q(N, s) denotes the increase in the probability that the project will be implemented if one more voter supports it. 6 Thus, r knows that given his posterior belief µ that B m is the expected value of F (0) = 1 − s with probability 1. The result shows the usefulness of polls in the absence of social pressure. Observing s allows r to choose the first-best level of effort, which maximizes his probability of being re-elected. We now consider the case with social pressure when supporting the project is unpopular, C > 0.
Proposition 1 Given the above assumptions, social pressure has no influence on policy.
The unique equilibrium of the polling game is h s, e * , µ
As before, r knows that the marginal opponent must be indifferent between opposing and supporting the project. This is the case if qB i = C. There is only one c.d.f. which satisfies F ³ C q´= 1 − s. Thus, r can be certain about the value of B m , and he can choose 5 We adopt the convention that citizens are opposed if they are indifferent. 6 It is tempting to think of q as approximately zero. However, in contrast to national elections where millions of voters participate and where the influence of a single vote is minute, professional surveys have small sample sizes. For instance, a national Gallup poll typically surveys about 1,000 individuals (Golay, 1997) . With more than 150 million registered U.S. voters, each respondent represents a significant share of the electorate. In doing so, they would have to bear the cost of social pressure, which is larger than the gain (or loss) from having better chances that the project will be implemented.
Supporters also do not want to change their publicly stated opinion because the reduced probability of seeing the policy put into effect weighs more heavily than the benefits of joining the more powerful opposition.
Given the type of uncertainty in this case, social pressure typically distorts policy in the sense that the expected benefit for the median voter systematically depends on the level of C. For instance, when a majority of citizens publicly opposes the low-variance project with B mβ , any increase in social pressure will reduce the perceived attractiveness of this undertaking. In contrast, the expected benefit of the high-variance project increases in C. Thus, social pressure systematically distorts policy-making even if the representative is fully aware of the pressure on citizens to offer socially desirable views. Depending on the project actually chosen, r's level of effort and consequently the probability of policy implementation can either be too low or too high to maximize r's probability of being reelected. The analysis thus highlights the importance of the nature of uncertainty. In simple cases -a random draw of the mean of an ex ante known distribution -polling information helps to adopt first-best policies. Once uncertainty becomes more complex, elected officials find it more difficult to interpret polls and social pressure can have a systematic influence on policy outcomes. However, this does not imply that public opinion polls are not helpful.
Taking polling information into account can narrow the set of feasible values of B m
Siting Disputes
The context for our empirical study is the search for a nuclear waste repository in Pennsylvania. Issues involving nuclear waste appear to be particularly suitable for a study of social pressure. After the accidents at Three-Mile-Island and in Chernobyl, nuclear issues and hazardous waste policies more generally have continued to agitate citizens to a great extent (Hamilton and Viscusi, 1999; Kuran and Sunstein, 1999) . Many individuals feel very strongly about nuclear energy, and announcements of siting plans for waste repositories regularly provoke storms of protest (Gerrard, 1994; Rabe, 1994) . The search for nuclear waste repositories provides numerous examples for outright social pressure. In the Pennsylvania case that we will study empirically, small business owners who were willing to consider hosting the waste repository were threatened with the boycott of their businesses.
In a Swiss case, the advocates of a waste facility proposed to fire the local teachers who led the opposition (Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger, 1996). An even more drastic example is the town of Gorleben, site of Germany's nuclear waste repository. For years, Gorleben resembled a militarized zone. The town was virtually occupied by German riot police who tried to protect violent proponents and opponents from one another (Rucht, 1980) . In view of the intensity of many siting disputes, residents of prospective host communities may well have incentives to hide their true preferences if these do not conform to the views of the majority. Thus, siting conflicts offer fertile ground to test a theory of decision-making under social pressure.
Issues involving nuclear waste also recommend themselves for a study of social pressure because the risks posed by these facilities are fairly difficult to understand. In fact, experts widely disagree if nuclear waste repositories pose any threat to local residents at all (Flynn et al., 1995). Our model suggests that social pressure is likely to influence policy in situations of complex uncertainty such as this one.
Survey
Our data come from a survey among Pennsylvania township supervisors. At the time of the survey, the State of Pennsylvania had been searching for a site for a number of years. In 1995, the Department of Environmental Protection announced a voluntary siting approach.
Under the "Community Partnering Plan" proposed by the state, interested municipalities can volunteer to host the facility. In exchange they will receive compensation. Township supervisors play a key role in this process. It is their task to enter into formal negotiations with the developer of the facility and to make sure that the outcome of these negotiations is "a clear expression of the will of the residents" (Chem-Nuclear Systems, 1996). Given the central role of township supervisors in the choice of a location for the PA nuclear waste repository, we asked the Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors to mail a paper-and-pencil survey to all supervisors in the state.
509 out of 1402 supervisors responded to the survey. 31% stated that they would support a plan to build the nuclear waste facility in their township. Supervisors expected citizens in their community to be more skeptical, indicating that only 16% would favor the project. In view of the strong opposition in virtually every township, it seems possible that citizens would feel pressured to join the majority and publicly speak out against this undertaking. To our knowledge, there had been no surveys regarding this issue in Pennsylvania. Thus, the supervisors' information about the views of citizens in their community is most likely to come from personal conversations and public meetings. As discussed in section 2, previous empirical research suggests that the lack of anonymity in these settings is likely to enhance the role of social pressure.
Empirical Strategy and Results
The goal of our empirical work is to explain the supervisors' support or opposition to the proposed nuclear facility. We are particularly interested in analyzing to what extent the supervisor's policy positions are influenced by public opinion and by social pressure. Our theory suggests two simple hypotheses. First, controlling for the economic impact of the waste repository, we expect increases in social pressure to discourage voters from publicly supporting the facility. Secondly, by influencing the views of the public, increases in social pressure can change the likelihood that township supervisors will favor the project.
In testing the first hypothesis, it is important to recognize that public opinion and social pressure are simultaneously determined. Citizens are more likely to oppose the facility if the pressure to speak out against it is high. But the level of pressure is itself a function of the fraction of citizens who oppose the facility. We estimate a system of two equations where the level of social pressure (C) is determined by the fraction of citizens supporting the facility (s), the land area that is suitable for the construction of the project (LA),
and by the number of citizens living in the township (N ). The fraction of citizens who are supportive is a function of social pressure, the economic benefits of the facility for the citizens (B), the health risks associated with the project (HR), and population size.
where all terms are township specific. With the exception of the land variable LA, all our data come from the survey. The questions used in this study are listed in the Appendix. Table 1 reports summary statistics for all variables.
We measure the level of social pressure in a township C by asking respondents about the likely cost that they would have to bear were they not to conform to majority views:
"Suppose 55% of all residents in your township were against the facility. What would happen if you, as a township supervisor, openly supported the facility?"
Respondents indicated on a 6-point scale whether or not they expected to "lose some respect" in their community (0=very unlikely to 5=very likely). 7 The vast majority of supervisors expected to lose some respect. 54 percent thought that this was very likely (highest score on the scale). These figures appear to reflect that most respondents regarded the issue as a socially sensitive question.
We use the land area, LA, which is technically suitable for construction of the facility, to identify the effect of social pressure on public opinion. This variable reflects geological and topographical characteristics of the townships. Title 25 of PA code, chapter 236, rules out areas with active faults and carbonate rock, gas and oil fields, river and coastal floodplains as well as geologically complex regions. In addition, the facility cannot be built on land with slopes greater than 15%. While most townships have some technically feasible sites, about 78% of the state's land was disqualified in a preliminary study (Chem-Nuclear Systems, 1996). 8 LA is a suitable variable to identify equation (6) because the availability of land, while uncorrelated with ε 2 , turns out to be strongly associated with social pressure.
Presumably, the siting of a nuclear waste repository is a politically less sensitive issueand social pressure is thus likely to be lower -in communities that only have small areas of technically suitable land. One interpretation is that those who are opposed to the facility do not exert much pressure if the probability of hosting the repository seems low.
The results in Table 2 show the influence of social pressure on public opinion. The higher social pressure, the smaller is the fraction of citizens who support the facility. Every one-point increase in pressure (as measured by the instrumented "loss of respect" scale) increases opposition by close to 5 percentage points. As is evident from a comparison of specifications (1) and (2) in Table 2 , it is important to take into account that social pressure and public opinion are simultaneously determined: The 2SLS estimates of the effect of social pressure are about one third larger than the OLS estimates. The variables describing the impact of the facility on township residents show the expected signs. The support of the repository increases if the economic benefits are larger and if the health risks are smaller.
Next, we turn to the analysis of the supervisors' policy positions. In the model, the representative's decision is determined by his belief about the impact of the policy on the median voter. In other words, social pressure matters because it changes the re-election constraint. In our empirical work, we use two proxies for this constraint. The first is the fraction of citizens who support the repository (s). The larger this fraction, the more likely it is that a supervisor will favor the undertaking. The second variable we use is a more direct measure of re-election concerns. In the survey, we asked respondents:
"What would happen if you, as a township supervisor, openly supported the facility?"
Respondents then indicated on a 6-point scale whether or not they thought it was likely that they would not be re-elected (0=very unlikely to 5=very likely). We did not ask respondents about the effort e they planned to expend on supporting or opposing the facility because e is hard to measure. Rather, we simply asked whether they favored (e > 0) or opposed (e < 0) the facility. The supervisor's decision is determined by the fraction of citizens who support the project (s), the economic benefits of the facility for the supervisor (B r ), the supervisor's health risks (HR r ) and a control for population size (N ),
As Table 1 indicates, supervisors expected more positive economic impacts for the residents living in their township (B) than for themselves (B r ). In contrast, the expected health effects for residents (HR) and supervisors (HR r ) are quite similar.
We first estimate (5) disregarding the endogeneity of s. This corresponds to previous work that has investigated the role of public opinion on policy-making (Page and Shapiro, 1983; Monroe, 1998) . Table 3 reports the results of a linear probability model. We find that both measures of the re-election constraint, the fraction of citizens opposing the project and the likelihood of not being re-elected, influence the supervisors' policy positions. As expected, they are more likely to support the facility if more citizens favor it. As was the case for residents, supervisors are more likely to support the project if the expected benefits for themselves (B r ) are larger and if the health risks (HR r ) are smaller.
Models (7) and (8) in Table 4 take account of the endogeneity of public opposition in equation (5). Here we also recognize that public opinion and social pressure are simultaneously determined. Citizens are more likely to oppose the facility if the pressure to speak out against it is high. But the level of social pressure is itself a function of the fraction of citizens who oppose the facility. We simultaneously estimate all three equations, treating social pressure, public opinion and the supervisors' policy decisions as endogenous variables.
The resulting 3SLS estimates document that increases in the fraction of citizens who oppose the project lead to greater social pressure to oppose the undertaking. At the same time, more significant social pressure strengthens the opposition. Finally, we find that supervisors are more likely to support the facility if a larger number of citizens is supportive. The same results hold for our alternative measure of the re-election constraint, the likelihood of not being re-elected. Compared to the "naive" models presented in Table   3 , the effect of public opinion on the likelihood of supervisors supporting the facility more than doubles in both models in Table 4 .
Using the siting of a nuclear waste repository as our example, we find evidence that is consistent with both hypotheses. It appears to be the case that citizens are less likely to speak out in favor of the proposed facility if there is greater social pressure not to endorse the undertaking. In addition, changes in public opinion, which are partially brought about by increases in social pressure, seem to influence the views of the township supervisors.
Thus, we find some empirical support for a theory of decision-making under social pressure which suggests that social pressure has the ability to influence policy-making.
Conclusions
In this paper, we study if public opinion influences the policy positions that elected officials choose to take. Our particular interest is in policy choices that are based on possibly distorted information. A large literature on social desirability biases indicates that surveys and publicly stated views may not always reflect the true preferences of citizens. They often seem to exaggerate their support for socially desirable activities. Similarly, they understate their preferences for activities that are seen as socially undesirable. The impact of the desirability bias on policy depends on the nature of uncertainty. In complex situations, the theory implies that social pressure can systematically affect policy choices.
This theoretical possibility is borne out in our empirical study. A more favorable public opinion increases the probability that Pennsylvania township supervisors will support the siting of a nuclear waste repository in their district. We show that social pressure affects the supervisors' decisions by influencing public opinion. As social pressure increases, public opinion is perceived to be more negative and supervisors believe that it becomes less likely that they will be re-elected if they support the repository. Consequently, these elected officials tend to withdraw their support for the project. Our empirical estimates indicate that social pressure, which is rarely taken into account in politico-economic analyses, can exert a considerable influence on local policy-makers. 
